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Domestic bank intermediation: domestically owned  
versus foreign-owned banks in Israel 
David Marzuk
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1.  The Israeli banking system – an overview 
A.  The structure of the banking system and its scope of activity 
Israel has a highly developed banking system. At the end of June 2009, there were 
23 banking corporations registered in Israel, including 14 commercial banks, two mortgage 
banks, two joint-service companies and five foreign banks.  
Despite the spate of financial deregulation in recent years, the Israeli banking sector still 
plays a key role in the country’s financial system and overall economy. It is also highly 
concentrated – the five main banking groups (Bank Hapoalim, Bank Leumi, First International 
Bank, Israel Discount Bank and Mizrahi-Tefahot Bank) together accounted for 94.3% of total 
assets as of June 2009. The two largest groups (Bank Leumi and Bank Hapoalim) accounted 
for almost 56.8% of total assets. 
The sector as a whole and the large banking groups in particular are organised around the 
concept of “universal” banking, in which commercial banks offer a full range of retail and 
corporate banking services. Those services include: mortgages, leasing and other forms of 
finance; brokerage in the local and foreign capital markets; underwriting and investment 
banking; and numerous specialised services. Furthermore, until the mid-1990s, the banking 
groups were deeply involved in non-financial activities. However, a law passed in 1996 
forced the banks to divest their controlling stakes in non-financial companies and 
conglomerates (including insurance companies). This development was part of a 
privatisation process which was almost completed in 2005 (with the important exception of 
Bank Leumi). 
The privatisation of the Israeli banking system has received particular attention in recent 
years. The government sold almost all of its shares in Bank Hapoalim Ltd, the largest bank in 
the Israeli banking system, during the 1990s. In 2005, the state completed the sale of all its 
remaining shares in the bank and it therefore no longer has any holdings in Bank Hapoalim 
Ltd (Table 1). 
In the last few years, Israel’s banking system has been undergoing a slow, moderate process 
of mergers: small banks are being bought by large- and medium-sized banks in order to take 
advantage of economies of scale and scope. Thus, nearly all mortgage banks have been 
merged with their parent companies. In addition, there has been a process of ownership 
changes of special purpose banks: three subsidiaries of Bank Hapoalim (Bank Massad, Bank 
Yahav and Otsar Hahayal) have been taken over by medium-sized banks. These changes 
strengthen medium-sized banks at the expense of large ones, thereby increasing competition 
in the banking system. It appears that some, albeit weak, signs of this are visible in the slow 
downward trend in indices of concentration (H and CR2), evident since the beginning of 
2006.  
                                                  




Privatisation of major nationalised banks 
December 1992  June 2009 
  Date of  
re-listing 
Government Government  Significant 
holders  Public 
Bank 
Hapoalim  06/1993 99.9  –  25.74  74.26 
Bank Leumi  09/1993  95.0  11.46  9.59  78.95 
Israel 
Discount Bank  03/1996 87.0  25.0  26.0  49.0 
Mizrahi-




01/1993 –  –  80.86  19.14 
 
Five foreign banks are operating in Israel – although they have only entered the market over 
the last decade or so, two of them have been operating in Israel since the turn of the century 
(Citibank (United States) and HSBC (United Kingdom)). Those two banks were joined by a 
further two in 2006–07: BNP Paribas (France) and the State Bank of India. In addition to 
those four branches, a subsidiary of the international Dexia group is operating in Israel. 
In January 2005, the Israeli Government sold 26% of the Israeli Discount Bank’s equity to the 
foreign investor group Treetops Acquisition Group (Canada), led by Matthew Bronfman. This 
move created the third largest banking group in Israel held by a foreign entity. Although, 
under the terms of the Israeli Banking (Licensing) Law, this bank is considered a foreign-
owned bank, it will be referred to in the present paper as a domestic bank. 
Total consolidated assets of the banking system (including foreign banks operating in Israel), 
were new Israeli shekel (NIS) 1.09 billion as of end-June 2009, compared with NIS 1.07 
billion at end-2008. The five major banking groups account for 94.3% of total assets, with 
similar shares of total loans and deposits. The share of other banks and foreign banks were 
3.72% and 1.95%, respectively (Figure 1). 
In addition to their classical banking intermediation activity, the banking groups also operate 
via their subsidiaries in areas that complement their commercial activities. The main activity 
complementing their classical banking activity is in credit cards, which has been continuously 
increasing over the last few years. Banks’ capital market activity has shrunk considerably 
over recent years as a result of the limitations on investment coming into effect, which greatly 
restricted the permitted level of holdings, so that banks could not control underwriting 
companies. At the same time, banks started providing banking and financial services to all 
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Note: Other banks include: Union Bank and Bank of Jerusalem. 
 
Israeli banks own banking subsidiaries abroad, mainly in the major global financial centres. 
Previously, these companies had great difficulty in competing with the large local banks and, 
as a result, their profits were low. In the last few years, Israeli banks have extended their 
activity abroad, both because of the partial contraction of their activity in Israel and because 
of their desire to extend their profit sources, utilising the advanced knowledge and 
technology developed in the domestic market. They have done this mainly by buying local 
banks, especially in emerging markets, in the expectation that those banks would be better 
able to compete with other local banks. 
In recent years, the government has sought to lessen the domination of banks over financial 
intermediation and increase competition in the financial market. Following the 
recommendations of the Bachar Commission in 2005, measures were introduced to 
encourage both intermediation through the capital markets and diversification in forms of 
wealth holdings. Consequently, non-bank sources now account for a rising share of credit to 
the business sector while the domestic bond and equity markets have expanded 
considerably. At the same time, the gains from increased competition at the retail end of the 
market have been less impressive. 
The Israeli banking system is active in three indexation segments: the unindexed local 
currency (nominal) segment (which amounts to approximately 40% of the group’s total 
assets), the indexed (to the consumer price index) segment; and the foreign currency 
(denominated or linked to the foreign exchange) segment. The share of the last two 
segments in the group’s total assets is approximately 30% each. 
B.  The global financial crisis and its effects on Israel 
Israeli banks experienced a strong uptrend in profitability from 2003 until late 2007. Since 
then, Israeli banks have been negatively influenced by the global financial crisis and the 
subsequent series of developments that have forced them to make large provisions and have 
either reduced their profits or pushed them into an outright loss. Nevertheless, all banks have 
remained sound and stable and there have never been any concerns that a local bank might 
fail. 
Total Assets:  NIS 1,094 billion 
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The developments began in late 2007 with the collapse of the special investment vehicles 
(SIVs), collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) and mortgage-backed securities markets that 
were not guaranteed by US government agencies and continued through to the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers in September 2008. Israeli banks suffered substantial losses from their 
exposure to Lehman Brothers as well as to other failed financial institutions. 
During 2008, the crisis started to adversely affect Israel’s real economy, mainly through a 
decline in the pace of economic and capital market activity, which suppressed the banks’ 
revenues from lending and other activities. Banks also had to make higher provisions against 
their corporate loan portfolios, especially for companies active in overseas real estate 
markets. 
In sharp contrast to most other countries, the Israeli banking system has at no time 
experienced liquidity shortages; on the contrary, the system has enjoyed a high level of 
liquidity in both local and foreign currency and was the beneficiary of net inflows of foreign 
currency during 2008. 
Compared with other banking systems, the Israeli banking system exhibited resilience to the 
shocks in the global financial markets and to their implications on the real economy. This can 
be ascribed to the following: the local banking system does not depend on credit lines from 
abroad; the lack of advanced money markets and limited securitisation cushioned the impact 
of the global crisis on Israel; the banking system was not a significant counterparty investing 
in the structural products market in the United States and Israeli banks were not plagued by 
a confidence crisis from domestic or foreign investors; Israeli banks depend primarily on 
retail funding rather than wholesale funding from financial institutions and capital markets; 
and, as Israeli banks have a considerable net liquidity position in foreign currency, the 
Finance Ministry accepted their surpluses in the form of deposits in foreign currency. In 
addition, the favourable macroeconomic conditions of recent years have enhanced the 
financial system’s ability to absorb losses. Banks’ credit risks declined while their capital 
adequacy was maintained.  
Although the exposure of the Israeli banking system to the global financial crisis was limited, 
the crisis has also affected the capital markets and non-bank financial institutions and put 
them under strain, as globalisation has created a high degree of correlation between Israeli 
capital markets and world markets. As a result of the financial crisis, the positive correlation 
between share indices in Israel and those in developed countries increased even further. 
Thus, the Israeli capital market was influenced by the major declines and increased volatility 
that characterised the global capital markets. The stock exchange fell sharply in September 
2008 and the trend intensified during October and November. The corporate bond market 
was also characterised by a sharp decline in prices. Fears among investors regarding the 
redemption of bonds, together with the uncertainty in the financial markets, led to a 
preference for solid investment channels and a wave of withdrawals from bond funds. During 
the second half of the year, the financial crisis spilled over into real activity. The economy’s 
rate of growth slowed following several years of prosperity and, during the last quarter of the 
year, the economy entered a recession, with negative GDP growth of 0.5%, annualised.  
As the crisis worsened, the Supervisor of Banks enhanced surveillance by increasing the 
frequency of certain returns and by introducing a number of new reports in areas that were 
expected to be most affected by the crisis (for details, see section C below). 
Additional measures taken by the government and the Bank of Israel include: the provision of 
government guarantees in the amount of NIS 6 billion for subordinated debt to be issued by 
banks – although this measure was taken to facilitate banks’ ability to increase their Tier-2 
capital at reduced cost, no bank has thus far found it necessary to use these guarantees; 
and the creation of investment funds (“leverage funds”) to expand the supply of non-bank 
credit by NIS 5 billion – since the announcement of this programme at end-2008, the 
Tel-Bond 60 broad index of corporate bonds has gained more than 15%, taking it back to its 
pre-crisis level. Risk premia have narrowed and activity in the primary market has picked up: BIS Papers No 54  239
 
 
issuance in the first half of 2009 amounted to NIS 16 billion, compared to NIS 22 billion for all 
of 2008; credit officers have been appointed to assist companies in dealing with the 
difficulties of rescheduling tradable bonds issued by them; and tax breaks have been 
established to encourage foreign investment in the Israeli economy and the inflow of funds 
from foreign companies controlled by Israeli residents into Israel. The government has 
created a defined safety net for pension savings with the goal of ensuring a basic pension for 
savers close to retirement whose pension savings have significant exposure to the capital 
market. In addition, the Bank of Israel has initiated a series of measures using monetary 
instruments with the goal of improving the liquidity situation in the economy and reducing 
costs for the business sector.  
C.  Banking Supervision Department – activity and reforms 
Maintaining the stability and resilience of the banking system in a changing economic 
environment is one of the Banking Supervision Department’s principal goals. The 
Department’s continuous and ongoing actions in pursuit of this goal, such as adopting the 
Basel II Directives, were augmented this year in view of the financial and real crisis in a 
series of special measures. 
Prior to the global financial crisis and in light of it, the Supervisor of Banks implemented 
several measures in order to maintain confidence in the banking markets and enhance 
Israel’s responsiveness in countering the adverse impact of this crisis. 
a.  Israeli banking groups were expected to reach a total risk-based capital ratio of 12% 
by year-end 2009. This target is in line with the implementation of the Basel II 
regime in Israel. The Supervisor of Banks strongly encourages Israeli banks to 
continuously upgrade their risk management systems within the Basel II framework.  
b.  The Supervisor of Banks established ad hoc task force teams to scrutinise banks’ 
risk exposures and to monitor their operations and liquidity positions. In addition, 
banks were required to adhere to several guidelines and to enhance the 
transparency of their financial reporting. The Supervisor is taking a proactive 
approach in dealing with the crisis and is conducting reviews via the supervisory 
functions in the Banking Supervision Department. 
c.  The Supervisor of Banks announced in January 2007 that Israel would adopt the 
Basel II regime by end-2009. It was anticipated that, during the preliminary phase of 
the Basel II regime, banks would implement the Standardised Approach to credit 
risk and the Basic Indicator Approach or the Standardised Approach to operational 
risk. The Supervisor promulgated temporary directives regarding the Basel II 
framework incorporating national discretions (including the advanced methods for 
credit risk but not the advanced methods for operational risk). 
As mentioned above, in 2008, mainly in the second half of the year, the Banking Supervision 
Department addressed several important issues relating to the ongoing stability of the 
banking system amid the global and domestic financial and real crisis. It instructed banks to 
increase the frequency of some of their returns as well as introduce new ones: 
  Reporting exposures to foreign financial institutions and countries: in 
September 2008, Israeli banks were instructed to report to the Banking Supervision 
Department more frequently regarding their exposures to foreign financial 
institutions wherever such exposures exceeded a certain percentage of the bank’s 
equity.  
  Reporting large exposures directly affected by the global crisis: Israeli banks 
were instructed to review, map and estimate their exposures to entities, other than 
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  Reporting large customers’ exposures to non-bank entities: Israeli banks were 
asked to provide special reports on large borrowers’ exposures to non-bank entities.  
  Reporting large customers showing adverse indications: Israeli banks were 
instructed to report to the Supervisor of Banks regarding any borrower that had 
issued at least one bond series which was subsequently traded at a yield to maturity 
greater than 15% and whose net indebtedness exceeded a certain percentage of 
the bank’s capital base or sums to a certain amount. The report specified the 
borrower’s indebtedness, credit rating and classification at the time of the review as 
well as the results of an examination of the borrower regarding the extent to which 
its non-banking debt affected its ability to settle its debts to the bank by means of a 
detailed analysis of its payback ability. 
  Reporting capital market exposures: Israeli banks were asked to advise the 
Supervisor of Banks of all exposures originating in capital market activity, including 
credit exposures that surpassed a certain percentage of the bank’s capital base.  
  Assessment of the quality of the credit given for the financing of acquisitions 
of controlling interest: in view of the considerable disparities between the value of 
the collateral in terms of securities prices on the exchange and the credit that the 
banks had given to some borrowers for the acquisition of controlling interest, the 
Supervisor believed it necessary to apply much greater caution in weighing the 
classification of such credit as impaired debt or making provisions in that regard. 
One of the reforms taken in recent years in the Israeli banking system refers to anti-money 
laundering. The Anti-Money Laundering Law was enacted in August 2000 and the sections 
pertaining to the obligations imposed on financial entities took effect in February 2002. In 
January 2001, the Governor of the Bank of Israel issued the Prohibition on Money 
Laundering Order. This Order includes requirements regarding identification, reporting and 
recordkeeping by banking corporations. The regulation regarding business customer 
identification and recordkeeping (a regulation that has been in effect since 1995) has been 
amended in light of the declaration of principles of the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision of October 2001 on “Customer due diligence for banks”. The regulation now 
incorporates directives on customer acceptance policy and the management and monitoring 
of high-risk accounts such as private banking, correspondent banking accounts and 
politically exposed persons (PEPS). 
The Banking Supervision Department conducts on-site examinations on an ongoing basis to 
determine banks’ compliance with anti-money laundering laws and directives. A Sanctions 
Committee, authorised to impose financial penalties for infractions, commenced operations in 
April 2003. In early 2005, the Prohibition of Terrorism Financing Law came into effect and 
Israel’s banking directive was modified to include combating terrorism financing. This 
modification stemmed from the international collaborative efforts in the areas of anti-money 
laundering and combating terrorism financing, which are reflected in the standards set by the 
Basel Committee (Consolidated KYC Risk Management, October 2004) and Israel’s 
legislation. 
Additional steps in the fight against terrorism financing were taken in November 2006, when 
the Knesset approved an amendment to the Prohibition on Money Laundering Order and 
approved regulations on the Prohibition of Terrorism Financing. The Prohibition on Money 
Laundering Order was expanded and now requires financial institutions to check the 
identification of parties to a transaction against a list of declared terrorists and terrorist 
organisations, as well as obligations to report the type and size of transactions above NIS 
5,000 whenever a high-risk country or territory is involved. The amended Order also requires 
credit card companies to identify the parties to transactions, report to the Israel Money 
Laundering Prohibition Authority and maintain records of transactions.  BIS Papers No 54  241
 
 
D.  Financial results – developments and trends 
(The five largest domestic banking groups (Israeli banks)): 
1.  After five years of growth, the net return on equity (ROE) dropped sharply in 2008 to 
0.4% compared with 15.6% in 2007 and 17.3% in 2006. The decline was a result of 
the realisation of losses in parts of banks’ securities portfolios; writedowns due to 
the non-temporary nature of fair value adjustments of securities; and exposures to 
foreign financial entities and their adverse effect on the real economy. Until mid-
2009, financial institutions, including Israeli banks, continued to exhibit resilience 
and banks became profitable again, with an ROE of 8.16% (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2 
Annual return on equity (ROE) of the five major banking groups (Israeli banks)  

















































1    As of 2005–07, banking corporations are required to calculate their ROE according to the method 
customary in the United States and other countries, ie as net income adjusted for the dividend for 
preference shares not recorded as expenditure in the profit and loss statement and declared in the 
reporting period only divided by the average equity. In this respect, the average equity is the total of all 
equity  minus the average balance of external shareholders’ rights minus/plus the average balance of 
losses/gains not yet realised from the adjustment of negotiable bonds at fair value, as well as the 
losses/gains from saleable bonds included in the equity. 
 
2.  Israeli banks’ capital increased by 6.9% in June 2009 after decreasing by 1.5% at 
year-end 2008 for the first time since the recession years (2001–03). The decrease 
was caused by the substantial negative charge to the capital account of 
approximately NIS 5 billion attributed to provisions of a temporary nature due to 
adjustments made to the fair value of securities (primarily mortgage-backed 
securities guaranteed by US government and federal agencies). Dividend 
distribution was very sparse and only two large banks disbursed in the first half of 
2008.  
  The total risk-based capital ratio reached 12.6% in June 2009 (Tier 1 ratio 7.9%), up 
from 11.2% (Tier 1 ratio 7.5%) at year-end 2008 (Figure 3). Having said that, the 
composition of Tier 1 capital exhibits a higher quality grade, as the Tangible 
Common Equity ratio is estimated to have reached over 6% in the last two years 242  BIS Papers No 54
 
 
due to the small amount of preferred shares and innovative instruments issued by 




1 of the five major banking groups (Israeli banks) 
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1  Minimum capital ratio since March 1999 (9%). 
 
3.  In 2008, Israeli banks incurred losses due to the depressed asset prices prevailing 
in the capital markets, which caused a decline in the income generated from the 
bond portfolio. This constituted a major factor in the 21.7% decrease in net interest 
income before loan loss provision expenses which amounted to NIS 17.9 billion in 
that year (down from NIS 22.9 billion in 2007). A significant component of that was a 
large bank’s investment in the structured product market, particularly in mortgage-
backed securities, which were not guaranteed by US government or federal 
agencies. This resulted in an NIS 3.9 billion loss during 2008 (an NIS 1.2 billion loss 
was recorded in 2007), which was reflected in the lower net interest income item. 
During the first half of 2009, the aggregate net interest income of Israeli banks 
increased by 31% compared with the corresponding period in 2008. 
4.  Israeli banks considerably increased their loan loss provision expenses during 2008, 
which rose by 186%, from NIS 1.78 billion in 2007 to 5.08 billion in 2008. The ratio 
of expenses to total loans amounted to 0.72% in 2008 compared with a mere 0.28% 
in 2007 (Figure 4). Most of the increase in expenses is attributed to loans to the 
construction and real estate, manufacturing and financial sectors. Notwithstanding 
the above, mortgage lending was resilient and problem loans to households 
increased by only 3.2%. The sum total of non-accrual loans amounted to 
NIS 10.3 billion after increasing by 10.8% in 2008. The ratio of non-accrual loans to 
total loans remained steady during 2008 at approximately 1.46%. 
  During the first half of 2009, loan loss provisions remained high and rose by 100% 
compared with the corresponding period in 2008. The increase was a result of the 
adverse effect of the financial crisis on the real economy in general and the 
business sector in particular. 
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5.  Israeli banks showed an increase in domestic activity in 2008 (a 13.5% rise in local 
currency) as credit to the public sector increased by 10.3%, a trend that 
demonstrated that credit markets in Israel were not suffering from the repercussions 
of the credit crunch that had emerged in some developed economies. This increase 
was partially due to the shifting of clients from the non-bank credit markets that had 
waned, while the cost remained substantially high due to the credit risk inherent in 
the non-bank credit markets. During 2009, that trend changed and credit to the 
public sector decreased by 1.4% as a result of the decline in economic activity and 
the recovery of the capital markets (ie the non-bank credit sector). 
6.  Due to the above – primarily the increase in loan loss provision expenses and the 
decrease in net interest income – Israeli banks’ net income amounted to a 
diminutive NIS 205 million in 2008 compared with NIS 8.9 billion in 2007. In 2008, 
net profit from non-recurring items was NIS 815 million – half of the 2007 profit – 
thus, net operating profit was a negative NIS 610 million in 2008. 
2.  Domestically owned banks versus foreign-owned banks 
A.  Foreign banks in Israel 
Until the beginning of the decade, foreign banks showed little interest in Israel’s economy for 
political as well as economic reasons including: the Arab boycott of companies with business 
relations with Israel and interests in Arab countries that acted to prevent companies 
engaging in activities in Israel even after the lifting of the boycott; the existence of an 
advanced banking industry which does not offer exceptional opportunities to the same extent 
as emerging economies; the lack of economic stability (high inflation, large deficits in the 
balance of payments and in the budget); and foreign exchange control. 
Over the last decade, foreign banks have exhibited a growing interest in the possibility of 
opening representative offices or branches in Israel in the light of processes which were 244  BIS Papers No 54
 
 
reflected in Israel’s improved credit risk rating, including: an improvement in Israel’s 
macroeconomic features (lower inflation and budgetary restraint); the invitation to join the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD); and the liberalisation 
and deregulation measures taken to promote and refine the financial market in Israel, for 
instance the process of removing foreign exchange control, which enabled Israel to 
participate in the globalisation trend. In addition, the development of Israeli high-tech 
companies opened up business opportunities for foreign banks to offer their services to such 
companies as well as to provide private banking facilities to the directors and managers of 
those companies who had amassed great wealth, thereby broadening the potential customer 
base for such services in Israel.  
Foreign banks’ activity in Israel is still in its infancy. Their entry into the market is usually 
through the opening of branches and not through the purchase of a domestic bank. Possible 
explanations for that are, as mentioned above: the fact that foreign banks do not have a 
technological advantage over local banks; and that Israel is a small economy with closed 
borders, which limits foreign banks in their provision of banking services to the local 
population and their ability to benefit from using the activity in Israel as a centre for banking 
services to neighbouring countries. 
Similarly to local Israeli banks, foreign branches operating in Israel did not experience severe 
shocks following the global financial turmoil and managed to remain sound. Nevertheless, 
foreign banks made some changes to their business strategies, most of which were needed, 
either due to the worsening conditions of the parent bank or to the economic environment in 
the home country, and were less affected by local factors. In addition, two groups expressed 
their confidence in the Israeli economy by making a business decision to expand their activity 
in Israel: Citibank – through the decision to allow two branches of the group to provide 
personal banking services in Israel, either through a branch or a representative office; and 
BNP Paribas – by opening a new representative office of the Swiss subsidiary (for more 
details see below). Unlike foreign banks operating around the world, most of the adjustments 
made by the foreign banks in Israel as a result of the crisis were made predominantly 
because of changes in the situation of either the parent bank or the home country and less 
because of factors related to the Israeli economy (the host country). 
Though they remained stable, several branches made some adjustments to their business 
strategy and personnel in light of the new economic and financial reality. Citibank (United 
States) and, to a lesser extent, HSBC (United Kingdom), the two foreign banks with the most 
established presence in Israel, made some changes to their credit policy and reduced their 
credit vis-à-vis Israeli corporate borrowers in the first six months of 2009 (although total credit 
to the public sector continues to grow). 
As for representative offices, Lehman Brothers (United States), which until its collapse was 
the foreign investment bank with the largest Israeli office, sold its Israeli business to Barclays 
Capital (United Kingdom). Barclays is now consequently expanding in Israel across a range 
of activities and may become more active in corporate lending when the environment 
improves. Merrill Lynch (United States) was also very active in Israeli investment banking; it 
remains to be seen whether its new owner, Bank of America (United States), will assume this 
role in the Israeli market. Other foreign banking groups active in Israeli investment banking 
such as UBS (Switzerland) and Deutsche Bank (Germany) have scaled back their activities 
as part of a global retrenchment.  
It should be mentioned that the branches of foreign banks in Israel also facilitate the 
business of Israeli firms and other customers with branches and units of their parent group 
around the world. Therefore, local data do not reflect full activity. 
A foreign bank can operate in Israel in three different forms: through a representative office, 
a branch or a subsidiary. BIS Papers No 54  245
 
 
1. Representative  office 
The representative office of a foreign bank in Israel may engage only in providing information 
and promoting the bank’s business in Israel and in activities relating to a customer’s request 
to open a bank account as determined periodically by the Supervisor of Banks. 
No permit is required under the Israeli Banking (Licensing) Law to open a representative 
office in Israel. However, if the intention is to use the word “bank” or a derivative of it in the 
name of the representative office, it must obtain the consent of the Governor of the Bank of 
Israel. A representative office and its activity are not supervised by the Supervisor of Banks 
(unless a doubt arises regarding the nature of its activity). In the near future, as part of the 
process of joining the OECD, the regulations may change in a way that will allow banks 
incorporated in one of the OECD countries to open a representative office only by pre-
notification to the Bank of Israel. 
There are currently 10 representative offices of foreign banks in Israel (not including the 
offices of domestic banks’ subsidiaries) which have received the Governor’s consent to 
include the word “bank” as part of their name. There were previously another four such 
banks which ceased their activities as representative offices in Israel (one expanded its 
activities and opened a branch in Israel). The offices currently operating in Israel are: 
  Bank Hapoalim (Switzerland) Ltd 
  Bank Leumi le-Israel (Switzerland) 
  Bank Leumi (Luxembourg) 
  Bank Leumi (United Kingdom) 
  Banque J Safra (Switzerland) 
  Banque Privée Edmond De Rothschild (Luxembourg) 
  Banque Safdie SA (Switzerland) 
  CALYON, Corporate and Investment Bank, Credit Agricole Group (France) 
  Credit Industriel et Commercial, CIC (CIC Banques) (France) 
  HSBC Bank USA NA 
  HSBC Private Bank (Switzerland) SA 
  IDB Bank, Israel Discount Bank of New York  
  IDB (Switzerland) Bank Ltd  
  JPMorgan Chase Bank NA (United States) 
  Union Bancaire Privée (Switzerland) 
Foreign banks’ growing interest in Israel resulting from the changes in Israel’s geopolitical 
and economic environment has been referred to above. This interest is also reflected in the 
number of representative offices which have been opened: from 1994 to 1997 there was a 
slow trickle (on average one office a year), while in 1998 and 1999 the rate increased, and 
the Governor gave his consent to three and four a year, respectively. In 2000, only one 
representative office opened; nonetheless, there is continued interest from foreign banks. 
Since 2000, nine more financial institutions have been granted permission to open a 
representative office in Israel, of which three have already opened and operate a 
representative office. 
In addition to the above, there has been a rise in activity in Israel by other foreign financial 
entities in the last few years, including banks in whose names the word “bank“ does not 
appear. They engage in areas such as investment banking, including underwriting services 246  BIS Papers No 54
 
 
and advising Israeli companies issuing shares or bonds abroad or prior to acquisitions or 
mergers as well as brokerage services. 
2.  Activities via a branch 
When operating a branch in Israel a bank must meet the following criteria in addition to the 
requirements for setting up a subsidiary: 
  Banking supervision in the home country must be performed on a consolidated 
basis, covering the branch to be opened in Israel, and in accordance with the 
international standards set by the Basel Committee. 
  The bank must provide “endowment capital” to the branch to enable stability 
restrictions to be applied. 
The permit granted to a foreign bank which meets the above criteria does not restrict the 
types of activities allowed in comparison with those allowed to domestic banks. 
There are currently four branches of foreign banks operating in Israel: Citibank NA; HSBC 
Bank PLC; BNP Paribas SA; and the State Bank of India.  
Citibank NA established a representative office in 1996 in Israel and in July 2000 became 
the first international bank with a full banking licence to offer a range of services to its clients 
in Israel. The branch offers large corporate finance, including underwriting and publicly 
distributing local corporate bonds, sales and trading, as well as cash management, import 
and export and trade finance solutions, and enjoys the advantage of Citigroup’s wide 
international coverage. The global financial crisis and the changes in the group’s 
management have not affected Citibank’s business strategy in Israel thus far, and the branch 
has maintained its focus on capital market activities. The branch made a slight reduction in 
employee numbers as part of the group’s policy to transfer some of the local activities to 
regional centres. 
In 2009, two branches of the Citibank group decided to provide personal banking services in 
Israel, either through foreign bank branches or through representative offices. 
In 2001, HSBC Bank opened a branch in Israel. HSBC operates in Israel in four areas: 
private banking, corporate banking, treasury services and investment banking services. The 
branch did not change its business strategy due to the global financial turmoil and, moreover, 
its scope of activity has extended in the last year. The branch is working to apply a new local 
risk management model – as required by the parent bank. No personnel changes have been 
made during that time. Outstanding loans have grown in the last three years and derivative 
activity is growing gradually, although it is not part of the branch risk, since it is recorded on 
London’s books. In addition to the branch, the HSBC group also operates two private banking 
representative offices in Israel that cater to local customers wishing to open foreign accounts. 
BNP Paribas group has operated in Israel since 1996, initially through a representative office 
(1998) and later through a banking branch (2006). The Israeli branch focuses on the 
following service activities: corporate and investment banking, as a trade centre and as a 
treasury platform. BNP Paribas Israel relies on the group’s global network to support major 
Israeli corporations in developing their international business activities and to facilitate 
international clients’ access to the local market. 
Due to the global financial crisis, new instructions from the group to the Israeli branch 
changed its method for pricing transactions but, apart from this, no other adjustments were 
needed as a result of the crisis. 
In 2009, one of the group’s subsidiaries – BNP Paribas (Suisse) – opened a new 
representative office which is expected to promote private banking in Israel. In addition, the 
local branch is considering providing investment banking services to its local clients. BIS Papers No 54  247
 
 
The State Bank of India’s branch in Israel was opened in 2007. The branch focuses on: the 
firms operating in the diamond industry which are either affiliated to India or have economic 
relations with it; providing guarantees to Israeli industries working with the Indian Government; 
and providing discounted bills in export transactions by Israeli corporates to India. 
3. Subsidiaries 
Banking activities can be performed in Israel by a foreign bank through a subsidiary either by 
establishing a new bank in Israel or by acquiring control of a domestic bank.  
The policy towards establishing a bank in Israel does not distinguish between holders of 
controlling interests who are non-residents, including foreign banks, and Israeli residents. 
There is one foreign-owned domestic bank currently operating in Israel – Dexia Israel Ltd 
bank. The bank is a subsidiary of the international Belgian–French Dexia group and began to 
operate in Israel by acquiring the local Israeli bank Otsar Hashilton Hamekomi through a 
privatisation process of the former which took place in 2001. The bank received a licence 
under the Israeli Banking (Licensing) Law in 2008, enabling it to provide a full range of 
banking activities in Israel; it has subsequently changed its name to Dexia-bank. One of the 
bank’s core activities in Israel is to provide financial services to municipalities. 
In October 2008, the branch’s parent bank was nationalised by the French, Belgian and 
Luxembourg Governments, mostly due to the substantial losses of the group's subsidiary 
(FSA) in the United States. In November of that year, the new management conducted a 
transformation plan to minimise exposures to market risks, focusing on public sector 
financing, mainly in France, Italy, Luxembourg, Belgium and Spain, and shut down its 
activities in several other countries. As for Israel, the bank did not make any changes 
regarding the business strategy and policy of its Israeli subsidiary. Nonetheless, the bank 
has made clear to the local subsidiary that it must not lean on the parent bank for new 
funding and should finance itself independently. In addition, the criteria for granting indemnity 
for transactions greater than the single borrower limit have been tightened.  
Two other subsidiaries operated in Israel until recently, both of which were acquired and 
merged into domestic banks: Bank Polska Kasa Opieki, a subsidiary of the Polish Bank 
Pekao (since 1999 the subsidiary has been part of the Italian bank UniCredito Italiano); and 
Investec Bank, controlled by the Investec group. Both banks were engaged in all types of 
banking activities. 
B.  Changes in bank lending 
The total balance sheet of the Israel banking system continued to expand during 2008 at a 
rate similar to previous years (about 5%). At end-2008, it stood at around NIS 1.07 trillion 
(including foreign banks). However, there were some significant changes in the composition 
of the balance sheet during 2008, which reflected an increase in classic financial 
intermediation, ie an expansion of bank credit and growth in bank deposits to the public 
sector, accompanied by a sharp decline in securitsation activities. This represents a reversal 
of the prolonged trend of disintermediation in recent years. 
In 2008, the banking system’s degree of dominance in economic activity increased as a 
direct outcome of the global financial crisis and the recession in 2008. Israeli non-bank 
lenders, notably provident funds and insurance companies, suffered heavy losses in the final 
months of 2008, as the price of many bonds, which they had eagerly snapped up during the 
boom period, collapsed. Bond issuance fell sharply, with many issuers and some entire 
sectors (such as real estate and construction) effectively frozen out of the market; the market 
for new equity issues closed almost entirely. Israeli banks enhanced the scrutiny of credit risk 
and, when the level of risk exceeded their risk preferences, they abstained from lending to 
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During 2008, banks’ securities portfolio shrank in size, both in terms of absolute value and as 
a proportion of the balance sheet. The drop in value was a result of both the sharp decline in 
asset prices as well as of the sale of parts of the portfolio. Simultaneously to the decrease in 
size of the securities portfolio, which reflects a reduction in non-classical financial 
intermediation, there was a major increase in bank credit to the public sector, which is a 
reflection of increased classical financial intermediation. Thus, total balance sheet bank credit 
to the public sector rose by 10% in 2008, its highest rate of growth in recent years (Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6 
Rate of change in credit to the public sector: domestic banks vis-à-vis  
foreign banks in Israel  
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Both foreign and domestic banks’ credit to the public sector grew substantially between 2003 
and 2008 as a result of two factors: the enhancement of foreign banks’ activity in Israel and 
the favourable macroeconomic conditions during those years (which were reflected in a 
growing demand for credit). BIS Papers No 54  249
 
 
As a result of this development, the proportion of credit to the public sector in the balance 
sheet rose by a proportion similar to the drop in the securities portfolio. This rise in credit was 
also reflected in the provision of bank credit to industries which, in previous years, had not 
been major recipients of bank credit, such as the construction and real estate industry. 
Outstanding bank and non-bank credit to the business sector remained practically 
unchanged in 2008. The slower pace of expansion in outstanding credit following three years 
of rapid growth – mainly in non-bank credit – was a consequence of the reduced supply of 
non-bank credit and the decline in bond prices caused by the increased assessment of risk in 
the financial market as a whole and in the corporate bond market in particular. The volume of 
business sector issues therefore fell heavily during 2008 overall. These issues ceased 
almost completely in the second half of 2008 and prices of CPI-indexed corporate bonds 
dipped significantly. 
The growth in bank credit to the business sector differed between the various types of 
customers: while bank credit to large firms grew significantly in 2008, the growth in credit to 
small- and medium-sized businesses (SMEs) came to a standstill from the second quarter of 
the year. 
The demand for credit during 2008 was affected by the downturn in the economy in two 
opposite directions: while the decline in investment reduced the demand for credit, the 
deterioration in firms’ real position increased their working capital requirements. As a result, 
the number of companies financing constraints increased in the second half of 2008, 
particularly among smaller firms in the construction, transportation and commerce industries. 
The rapid development of local non-bank credit during recent years (Figure 5) created an 
alternative channel to bank credit and led to a broader diversification of the credit risk in the 
economy, which could have contributed to the stability of the institutions extending credit as 
well as to the creation of a more competitive financial system. However, that was not the 
case, and the rapid growth actually led to an increase in the potential risk  of the credit 
portfolio in the economy. 
A significant part of the growth in total bank credit occurred in 2008 due to households, 
including both housing and consumer loans (Figure 7). This sector is considered to be less 
risky due to its high degree of diversification (indeed, the annual expenses due to the loan 
loss provision for this sector grew much less than for the business sector). The increase in 
demand for credit among households during the first three quarters of the year came to a halt 
during the fourth quarter – a trend parallel to that of private consumption, which is the main 
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The expansion of credit for housing in 2009 was a result of the public’s desire to change the 
composition of its asset portfolio by moving away from financial assets to tangible assets. 
This trend appeared in 2008 as financial and capital market volatility intensified. A major 
portion of the funds withdrawn from provident funds was channelled into the housing market 
(which experienced a moderate rise in prices, primarily in areas of high demand).  
Despite the increase in the credit risk of borrowers last year, the activity in housing loans is 
still considered to represent a low credit risk. Evidence of this is the stability (and even slight 
reduction) in total accumulated arrears among mortgage holders during the course of 2008, 
despite the economic slowdown. 
An examination of the breakdown according to indexation segment shows that most of the 
expansion in bank credit in 2008 occurred in the unindexed segment, including both the 
business sector and the retail and household sector (Figure 7). This increase is the 
continuation of a trend which is partly explained by the continuous reductions in the short-
term monetary interest rates, as set by the Bank of Israel, which are the key interest rates for 
transactions in that segment.  
Vis-à-vis the increase in total bank credit to the public sector in 2008, as mentioned above, 
the scope of banks’ activity in securities declined substantially in 2008 (from NIS 163 billion 
to NIS 130 billion); this decline occurred after several years (2006–07) during which the 
banks had increased, stabilised and diversified the composition of their securities portfolio. 
The proportion of government bonds, which are low-risk assets, declined, while the 
proportion of other debt securities increased, mainly as a result of the purchase of asset-
backed securities (ABS) issued by financial institutions and firms.  
The sharp rise in bond spreads in Israel also led to a decline in the value of corporate bonds 
issued in Israel; however, thanks to the relatively small magnitude of this exposure (about 
NIS 6.6 billion), the effect on the risk of the securities portfolio was fairly minor. Unlike 
corporate bonds issued abroad, most of which are issued by the financial sector, investment 
in domestic bonds is characterised by a high level of diversification among the various 
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C.  Changes in bank funding 
Banks operating in Israel raise most of their funds through offering short- and medium-term 
deposits and savings schemes to their household customers as well as through the issuance 
of bonds and notes on the domestic market or directly to institutions. The funds thus raised 
can be either unlinked or CPI-linked, and their composition will vary in line with current and 
expected inflation rates and the influence they have on both household and business 
demand for various types of funds and on banks’ internal funding structure and needs. 
At the end of June 2009, total interest bearing liabilities of banks operating in Israel 
amounted to NIS 1.02 trillion, a 10% increase compared to the corresponding period in 2008, 
of which about 2% came from foreign banks and the rest from domestic banks. Deposits, 
which are the primary source of bank funding, constituted around 82.4% of interest bearing 
liabilities among domestic banks and a smaller share of 66.5% among foreign banks. While 
bonds and subordinated debt constituted around 7.2% among domestic banks, that figure 
was much lower among foreign banks and their share amounted to less than 1% of banks’ 
interest bearing liabilities (among foreign banks, the only bank involved in raising funds 
through bonds and subordinated debt notes is Dexia-Israel). During the first six months of 
2009, bond issuance and subordinated debt increased by NIS 5 .6 billion (8%) among 
domestic banks, reflecting the direct continuation of the trend prevailing in recent years that 
had helped banks to increase their capital adequacy, as they were expected to reach a total 
risk-based capital ratio of 12% by year-end 2009. As required by the Basel Accord, the 
Supervisor of Banks in Israel limits the use of such notes to a maximum of 50% of the Tier 1 
capital as eligible capital for the calculation of the risk-based capital ratio – a limit exploited 
by three of the five major banking groups in Israel (due to year-end 2008). 
Total public sector deposits rose by 4.2% during 2008. After falling by 3% in the first six 
months of 2008, total public sector deposits increased sharply from June 2008 to June 2009 
(9.3%), mostly during the last six months of 2008 (7.2%). This increase might be explained 
by the rise of risk assessments in the financial markets in the wake of the crisis, as volatility 252  BIS Papers No 54
 
 
increased and risk margins expanded. These assessments led to higher rates of withdrawals 
from provident funds during the year, which prompted the public to seek lower-risk forms of 
investment. In periods of uncertainty, investors have a diminished risk appetite and therefore 
prefer to minimise exposure through bank deposits, which are considered a “safe haven”, at 
least in the medium term.  
Compared with domestic Israeli banks, which maintain a steady growth rate in total public 
sector deposits, the rate of change among foreign banks is more volatile. The high growth 
rate of the early years (2003–05) stemmed from the enhancement of their activity in Israel, 
and the low and negative rates of 2007–08 stemmed from the financial crisis, as foreign 
banks were perceived as less sound than domestic banks. In 2009, that trend changed with 
an increase of over 20% in deposits to the public sector among foreign banks (Figure 9). 
Figure 9 
Rate of change in public sector deposits: domestic  
banks vis-à-vis foreign banks in Israel  
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As with loans, deposits can be transacted in unlinked Israeli shekels, in CPI-linked Israeli 
shekels or in a foreign currency (including a foreign currency-linked clause), and each sector 
is influenced by different competitive and pricing forces. Unlinked shekel intermediation 
activity is a short-term activity, mostly up to a year. The primary fund sources in this sector 
are either the unlinked public sector deposits or the monetary loans provided by the Bank of 
Israel. Since December 2008, due to a liquidity surplus in the banking system, no monetary 
loans have been granted by the Bank of Israel and the share of unlinked deposits among 
total unlinked interest bearing liabilities was, as of June 2009, around 90% (Figure 10), an 
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The CPI-linked sector is characterised as a medium- to long-term activity. The primary fund 
sources are medium- to long-term linked public sector deposits or deposits in savings 
accounts, bonds and subordinated debt notes. Whereas the share of linked deposits and 
deposits in savings accounts in total linked interest bearing liabilities has not changed 
significantly since June 2008 (approximately 65%), the share of bonds and subordinated 
debt notes issued by banks has increased by 2 percentage points to 20.5%, amounting to 
NIS 34.4 billion in June 2009. Although banks have increased the funds raised through this 
channel, they have not used it to grant credit to the public sector, even though the purpose 
was to use these funds to increase capital adequacy, as mentioned above. Among foreign 
banks, all of the CPI-linked funds are raised by Dexia-Israel bank through institutional 
investors, deposits of municipalities and local authorities, public sector deposits (both 
corporate and retail) and bond issuance. 
When referring to public sector deposits in Israeli banks, two unique features of the Israeli 
banking system should be highlighted: the first is its large non-resident foreign currency 
deposits, which are considered to be solid and firm and more than matched by assets. These 
non-resident deposits come from the large Jewish diaspora and have been stable for many 
years. The second unique feature is the absence of a formal deposit insurance scheme in 
Israel. However, the law specifies that the Governor of the Bank of Israel may decide to 
guarantee in whole or in part bank deposits in which it has intervened or other classes of 
bank liabilities. The guarantee may be for a limited or unlimited time, either subject to 
conditions or unconditional. The implicit government guarantee is a result of the precedent 
established in 1983 when the government saved the major Israeli banks by nationalising 
them. The authorities strengthened this precedent by guaranteeing the deposits of two small 
banks which failed in 1985 and 2002. The Governor of the Bank of Israel is empowered to 
guarantee deposits upon receiving the government’s approval. In fact, the authorities have 
never permitted bank depositors to lose money and market participants believe that the 254  BIS Papers No 54
 
 
government has an implicit guarantee for all bank deposits. Except for the cases specified, 
no bank in Israel has required government intervention – including foreign banks operating in 
Israel (whether through subsidiaries or branches). In a recent pronouncement on this subject, 
the authorities indicated that there would be no discrimination between local and foreign 
banks if a formal deposit insurance scheme were to be established. 
D.  Banks’ balance sheet liquidity 
Liquidity risk is measured and managed in the Israeli banking system through internal 
models that monitor the liquidity situation using various indices and scenarios.
2 The internal 
models developed by the banks are differentiated by their working assumptions and methods 
of calculation and are derived from the characteristics of each bank’s customer base. These 
models also take into account other factors, such as the dependence of the bank on large 
depositors, ie the degree of concentration among depositors, the bank’s ability to obtain a 
credit line abroad and from the parent bank, and the bank’s reputation, etc.  
The banks use their internal models, based in general on statistical tests, to derive the rates 
at which to recycle their deposits (according to various segmentations: size, type and period 
of deposit, type of indexation, etc) and their ability to liquefy various assets. The models are 
also used to calculate the following liquidity indices on a daily basis: the liquidity gap 
according to the period to maturity (a day, up to a week, up to a month, up to three months, 
up to six months, up to 12 months and longer than 12 months) and the ratio of liquid assets 
to liabilities with a time to maturity of up to one month. In addition, liquidity indices are 
analysed for various scenarios, such as stress tests, that are related to a crisis at the bank or 
a general crisis (war, political upheaval, shocks to the financial markets, etc), and which 
demonstrate how the bank would continue to operate in a crisis at a reasonable cost for a 
one-month period. Since the crisis began in September 2008, most of the banking system 
has been operating according to extreme scenarios, which require the holding of larger 
reserves of liquid assets. 
Although Israeli banks did not experience a liquidity crisis, liquidity risk has risen. In 
September 2008, in an effort to monitor the stability of the banking system and to enhance 
the transparency of financial reporting, banking corporations were asked to provide the 
Supervisor of Banks with newly formatted reports on liquidity risk. In addition, and as 
mentioned above, an ad hoc task force team was established by the Supervisor of Banks to 
scrutinise banks’ risk exposures and to monitor their operations and liquidity positions. 
The liquidity crisis led the Bank of Israel (BoI) to adopt a series of monetary measures: 
a.    In April 2009, the BoI reduced the absorption of liquidity surpluses through the 
issuance of makam (1-year nominal T-bills). Since that time, excess liquidity has 
been absorbed primarily by allowing commercial banks to increase their deposits at 
the BoI (which are not considered part of the money base). This means that the 
public’s portfolio has shifted from foreign currency and/or bonds to currency or 
deposits. Public sector deposits provide most of the liquidity to commercial banks, 
and banks do not use all the additional liquidity to offer loans – this liquidity, 
excluding a small fraction which they are required to hold as reserves, is absorbed 
by the BoI as commercial banks’ deposits at the prevailing rate (0.5%). 
Consequently, the base expands only by a small amount while M1 expands 
considerably due to the very low interest rates. 
                                                  
2   Liquidity risk is measured and managed in the Israeli banking system using internal models and, therefore, 
banks are not obligated to achieve a ratio of 1, as required by the standard model in Directive no 342 of the 
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b.   Monetary loans of a longer maturity were added to those currently issued by tender 
to the banking system for durations of one day and one week. 
c.   The spread around the BoI interest rate at the credit window (the “corridor”) and at 
the deposit window for commercial banks was lowered from ±1% to ±0.5%, and at 
the beginning of 2009 there was a further reduction to ±0.25%. 
d.   Repo tenders to commercial banks and financial institutions were offered for longer 
than the previous term of one week. 
e.   The purchase of government bonds by the BoI has helped to reduce the yields on 
long-term government bonds. Additionally, the purchase of bonds has helped the 
capital markets to return to more normal functioning, particularly with regard to the 
renewal of issuances and the raising of capital by the business sector; the BoI 
ceased buying bonds in August 2009. 
Other changes in BoI policy during 2008 which increased liquidity (although that was not their 
primary goal) included: 
a.    The intervention by the BoI in the foreign currency market for the first time in 
11  years, which involved the purchase of foreign currency (in the amount of 
NIS 55 billion thus far) and the corresponding injection of shekels.
3 
b.   The lowering of the interest rate five times during the last quarter of 2008 (two of 
which were inter-meeting decisions, ie not taken on the regular interest rate 
announcement dates), from 4.25% to 1.75%. Since the beginning of 2009, the BoI 
has continued to lower the interest rate to record low levels and in April it was 
lowered to a level of only 0.5%.
4 In September 2009, the interest rate was raised by 
0.25 percentage points only, to 0.75%, a rise that stemmed from the need to bring 
inflation back to the target set by the government while at the same supporting the 
recovery of economic activity. 
Since December 2008 and throughout 2009 there was a noticeable upward trend in the 
liquidity of the banking system, characterised by a basic liquidity surplus, and banks began 
placing deposits with the BoI. This is in contrast to the basic liquidity deficit prevailing until 
December 2008, during which the BoI offered banks loans by tender.
5  
As a result of the worsening of the crisis in September 2008, Israeli banks as well as foreign 
banks also took a number of steps aimed at maintaining a level of liquidity that was 
appropriate to the level of uncertainty. These included an increase in their deposits, both at 
local banks and at the BoI, as well as in their holdings of government bonds, which was 
carried out simultaneously with a reduction in deposits at foreign financial institutions and the 
shortening of their duration. Consequently, the ratio of liquid assets to liabilities with up to 
one month to redemption increased steadily from September 2008 to June 2009, both in 
Israeli and foreign banks and, as can be seen in Table 2, the increase among Israeli banks 
was more moderate compared to foreign banks.  
                                                  
3   The goal of the purchases was to halt the appreciation and to adjust foreign exchange reserves to the levels 
generally accepted in other countries.  
4   The main goal of lowering the interest rate was to keep to the inflation target and support real economic 
activity.  
5   Another development in 2008 that worked to reduce the liquidity risk implicit in the settlement process was the 
addition of the shekel as a currency cleared through CLS (Continuous Linked Settlement), an international 




Local currency and foreign currency liquidity indices, the standard model
a 
(September 2008 to September 2009) 
(Ratio of liquid assets to liabilities with up to one month to redemption) 
  09/2008 12/2008 03/2009 06/2009 
Domestic banks  0.19 0.26 0.28 0.32 
Foreign banks  0.31 0.39 0.49 0.61 
Banking system   0.19 0.27 0.29 0.33 
a  The standard model as described in Directive no 342 of the Proper Conduct of Banking Business. 
 
 